Ideas from 'Language,Truth and Logic' by A.J. Ayer [1936], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Language, Truth and Logic' by Ayer,A.J. [Penguin 1974,0-14-021200-0]].

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

5196	Philosophy is a department of logic

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason

5189	Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics

7919	Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Macdonald,C]

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis

5195	Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

5179	Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth

4749	We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism

5202	Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies

6523	Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Robinson,H]

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

5183	Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

6525	Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H]

5170	Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

5198	We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino]

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic

2619	Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention

5197	By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic

5204	To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

6524	Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Robinson,H]

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception

5193	Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables

12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism

5200	The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism

4729	Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady]

5180	All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses

5169	My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism

5185	It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

5199	Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths

14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction

5190	The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past

14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction

5191	We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds

5177	Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds

5178	A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations

5172	If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body

5173	Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body

5176	Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique

5171	The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances'

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification

5181	A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition

5184	Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences

5186	Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism

5205	Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism

23725

Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Smith,M]

5206	To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions

5208	A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique

5187	When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists

28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism

5207	If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism.

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / c. Religious Verification

5209	The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant